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Abstract. We consider the existence and computational complexity of
coalitional stability concepts based on social networks. Our concepts rep-
resent a natural and rich combinatorial generalization of a recent ap-
proach termed partition equilibrium [5]. We assume that players in a
strategic game are embedded in a social network, and there are coordi-
nation constraints that restrict the potential coalitions that can jointly
deviate in the game to the set of cliques in the social network. In addi-
tion, players act in a “considerate” fashion to ignore potentially profitable
(group) deviations if the change in their strategy may cause a decrease
of utility to their neighbors.
We study the properties of such considerate equilibria in application to
the class of resource selection games (RSG). Our main result proves ex-
istence of a considerate equilibrium in all symmetric RSG with strictly
increasing delays, for any social network among the players. The exis-
tence proof is constructive and yields an efficient algorithm. In fact, the
computed considerate equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium for the stan-
dard RSG showing that there exists a state that is stable against selfish
and considerate behavior simultaneously. In addition, we show results on
convergence of considerate dynamics.
1 Introduction
Game theory provides tools for the analysis of the outcome of social interaction
of self-motivated, rational agents. Rationality is usually captured in a way that
agents are acting autonomously in order to maximize a utility function. This
leads to much interest in the study of stable outcomes in games, making it
the central topic in game theory. In strategic games the standard concept of
stability is the Nash equilibrium (NE) – a state resilient to unilateral strategy
⋆ This work was supported by the German Israeli Foundation (GIF) under contract
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changes of players. While a mixed Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist, a pure
Nash equilibrium might not exist in general, though has been proven to exist in
several interesting classes such as congestion games [12,15]. A drawback of Nash
equilibrium is that it neglects coalitional deviations by groups of players; these
are captured most prominently by the notion of strong equilibrium (SE) [3], in
which no coalition can strictly improve the utility of all participants. A slightly
stronger variant termed super-strong equilibrium (SSE) [5, 16] guarantees that
no coalition can strictly improve any participant without strictly deteriorating
at least one other participant. SSE postulates the natural and widely considered
condition of (strong) Pareto efficiency [13] for every coalition. However, while
stability against deviations by coalitions of players is a most natural desideratum,
it is well-known that there are only very few strategic games with SE, and SSE
are even harder to guarantee.
In contrast to the assumptions underlying SE and SSE, many real-life scenar-
ios allow only certain subsets of players to cooperate because a group of players
has to find a deviation, agree on it, and coordinate individual actions. This is
impossible for a subset of players that are completely unrelated to each other. A
promising recent approach for limited coalitional deviations was studied promi-
nently in resource selection games [5]. In this case, there is a given partition of
the set of players such that only sets of the partition can implement coalitional
deviations. The power of this restriction was demonstrated on the concept of
SSE - a partition equilibrium is a SSE subject to coalitional deviations by player
sets in the partition only. In contrast to SSE, it was shown that partition equi-
librium always exists in resource selection games [1], and that the profiles are
also NE - that is, coalitional and unilateral stability are obtained simultaneously.
The restriction of coalitional deviations in partition equilibrium essentially pos-
tulates two structural properties: (1) coalitions of players that execute a strategy
change have to be close to each other, and (2) their decision must strictly benefit
at least one of them but not strictly deteriorate any other player close to them.
The notion of closeness is defined in both cases simply as being in the same
partition.
In this paper, we significantly strengthen the partition equilibrium concept
by considering coalitional deviations and equilibria based a rich combinatorial
structure derived from a social network among the players rather than just par-
titions. In our case, (1) coalitions of players that execute a strategy change must
be cliques in the graph, and (2) their decision must not strictly deteriorate any
neighboring players. The solution concept naturally corresponding to consider-
ate behavior is the considerate equilibrium, i.e., a state in which (1) no coaliton
formed by a clique in the social network can deviate so that the utility of at
least one member of the coalition strictly improves and (2) none of the players
neighboring the clique gets worse. Observe that partition equilibrium evolves as
a special case of considerate equilibrium when the social network is composed
of a set of disjoint cliques. To the best of our knowledge, our approach has not
been considered before.
We study considerate behavior in the prominent class of resource selection
games (RSG). In an RSG, each player chooses one of a finite set of resources, and
its cost is given by a delay function depending on the number of players choosing
the resource. RSGs are a fundamental setting in computer science, operations
research and economics, due to their practical applicability (e.g., in electronic
commerce and communication networks) and plausible analytical properties. In
particular, for strictly increasing delay functions, SE always exist [9, 10], but
SSE do not necessarily exist [5]. The latter fact is the motivation for studying
the effects imposed by natural restrictions to the coalitional structure on the
existence of SSE initiated by Feldman and Tennenholtz in [5].
1.1 Our Results
We show that regardless of the social network, all RSGs with strictly increasing
delay functions possess a considerate equilibrium. Our proof in Section 3 is con-
structive and yields an efficient algorithm for computing such an equilibrium.
Indeed, the computed super-strong considerate equilibrium is an NE for the
standard RSG showing that there exists a state that is stable against selfish and
considerate behavior simultaneously. Observe that the number of cliques might
be exponential in the number of players such that not even the computation of a
single improving move is non-trivial. We solve this problem by showing that, in
an NE, every profitable deviation of a clique is witnessed by a move of a single
player decreasing a suitably defined potential function. In addition, our proof is
fundamentally different and significantly simpler than the proof for existence for
the special case of partition equilibrium in [1].
In Section 4, we consider convergence properties of dynamics. Let us remark
that the potential function approach from the existence proof does not imply that
the sequential dynamics defined by deviations of cliques is acyclic, since the single
player moves considered in the existence proof do not necessarily correspond
to allowed improving moves. Indeed, we show that even for identical, strictly
increasing delays there are infinite sequences of improving moves of cliques. This
is in contrast to the dynamics corresponding to partition equilibrium, for which
we can show the finite improvement property in this setting.
1.2 Related work
Using a social network approach to restrict coalitional deviations in games, our
work is related to an emerging area in social sciences, game theory, and com-
puter science. While the study of social connections is central to social sciences,
and the notion of stability is central to game theory, a standard tool for ana-
lyzing the interplay between social context and outcome of games has received
attention only recently. Perhaps most relevant in this spirit are [1,5] on partition
equilibrium discussed above.
The notion of partition equilibrium is related to work on social context
games [2], where a player’s utility can be affected by the payoffs of other players.
For example, a player may be interested in ranking his payoff as high as possible
comparing to the others’ payoffs [4], or a player may care about the total payoff
of a subset of his “friends”, as in coalitional congestion games [8, 11]. A social
context game is then defined by some underlying game, the social context given
by some topological or graph-theoretic structure of neighborhood, and aggrega-
tion functions capturing the effects of utility changes in the underlying game on
player incentives. In [2], RSG are considered as the underlying games, and four
natural social contexts are studied. However, unlike for partition equilibrium,
this work deals only with unilateral deviations.
While [2, 5] are initial steps in relating the social structure to the outcome
of a game, they are quite restrictive in that only particular social contexts and
fixed coalitional structures (partitions) are considered. In addition, they ignore
the phenomenon of considerate behavior which is present in our work. Similar
arguments apply w.r.t. [7], where fixed coalition structures in load balancing and
congestion games are studied. Here coalitions act as single “splittable” coalition
players that strive to minimize the makespan or the sum of costs of the agents
in the coalition.
2 Preliminaries and Initial Results
A strategic game is a tuple (N, (Si)i∈N , (ui)i∈N ), where N is the set of n play-
ers, Si is a strategy space of player i. A state s of the game is a vector of
strategies (s1, . . . , sn), where si ∈ Si. For convenience, we use s−i to denote
(s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sn), i.e., s reduced by the single entry of player i. Simi-
larly, for a state s we use sC to denote the strategy choices of a coalition C ⊆ N
and s−C for the complement, and we write s = (sC , s−C). The utility of player
i in state s is ui(s) ∈ R. For a state s a coalition C ⊆ N is said to have an
improving move if there is s′C such that ui(s
′
C , s−C) > ui(s) for every player
i ∈ C. In particular, the improving move is unilateral if |C| = 1. A state has a
weak improving move if there is C ⊆ N and s′C such that ui(s
′
C , s−C) ≥ ui(s)
for every i ∈ C and ui(s′C , s−C) > ui(s) for at least one i ∈ C. A (pure) Nash
equilibrium (NE) [14] is a state that has no unilateral improving moves, a strong
equilibrium (SE) [3] a state that has no improving moves, and a super-strong
equilibrium (SSE) [5] a state that has no weak improving moves.
To model considerate behavior, we adjust the definition of improving moves.
In particular, there is an undirected, unweighted graph G = (N,E) over the set
of players. For a subset C ⊆ N consider the neighborhood of C as N (C) = {j ∈
N | ∃i ∈ C, {i, j} ∈ E}.
Definition 1 (Considerate Improving Moves). A state s has a considerate
improving move for a coalition C if there is s′C such that ui(s
′
C , s−C) > ui(s)
for all i ∈ C and uj(s′C , s−C) ≥ uj(s) for all j ∈ N (C). For a unilateral
considerate improving move we have |C| = 1. A state s has a weak considerate
improving move for a coalition C if there is s′C such that ui(s
′
C , s−C) ≥ ui(s)
for all i ∈ C ∪ N (C) and ui(s
′
C , s−C) > ui(s) for at least one i ∈ C.
Note that every (weak/unilateral) considerate improving move is also a (weak/uni-
lateral) improving move but not vice versa. To define coalitional equilibria, let
us, for the time being, also assume that there is a set system of feasible coalitions
C ⊆ 2N . A considerate Nash equilibrium (CNE) is a state s that has no unilateral
considerate improving moves. A (super) strong considerate equilibrium ((S)SCE)
is a state s that has no (weak) considerate improving move for a coalition C ∈ C.
Note that for CNE we implicitly assume C is the set of all singleton sets {i} for
all i ∈ N . Every NE is a CNE, and every (S)SE is a (S)SCE. The converse only
holds for CNE and NE if E = ∅. In general SCE and SSCE are SE and SSE
only if E = ∅ and C = 2N , respectively. In this way, existence of social ties
and a non-trivial set of feasible coalitions weaken the structural requirements
for existence of equilibrium.
In the rest of the paper, we make the natural assumption that the set of
feasible coalitions corresponds to the set of cliques in G. In our analysis, we focus
on weak improving moves and study super strong considerate equilibria as we
believe that this solution concept is most interesting not only from a technical
point of view but also a natural and convincing model for the interaction of
coalitional structures in the presence of a social network.
Definition 2 (Considerate Equilibria). A considerate equilibrium (CE) is a
state s that has no weak considerate improving move for a coalition corresponding
to a clique in G.
Note that CE nicely generalizes partition equilibrium. In particular, a par-
tition equilibrium is a CE if the social network G is partitioned into isolated
cliques. Note that we do not explicitely assume that the set of feasible coalitions
is restricted to maximal cliques. If the graph is partitioned into isolated cliques,
however, this rather technical assumption made in the definition of partition
equilibrium is a natural consequence of the assumption that the coalitions be-
have considerately since one can assume w.l.o.g. that all members of a partition
participate in a coalition as weak improving moves do not decrease the utility
of neighboring players.
Resource selection games (RSG), sometimes referred to as singleton conges-
tion or parallel link games, are a basic class of potential games. There is a set
of resources R and Si = R for every player i ∈ N . For a state s we denote by
ℓr(s) the number of players that pick r ∈ R in s. For each resource r ∈ R there
is a delay function dr(x) ∈ N. Throughout the paper we assume that all delay
functions are non-negative and strictly increasing. In a state with si = r, player
i has cost ci(s) = −ui(s) = dr(ℓr(s)).
In this paper, we consider RSGs with strictly increasing delays. In this case,
it is known that NE exist [15], can be computed in polynomial time [6], and
are equivalent to SE [9]. Moreover, the games possess a (strong) potential func-
tion [9, 12], i.e., every sequence of unilateral improving moves has finite length
and ends in a NE/SE. Trivially, by restriction of improving moves, the same
holds also for CNE and SCE. Interestingly, however, even in simplest games
SSE are not guaranteed to exist5. In contrast, we show below that CE always
5 Consider a game with N = {1, 2, 3}, R = {r1, r2}, and dr1(x) = dr2(x) = x.
exist. However, even for identical resources we show that there are infinite se-
quences of weak considerate improving moves of coalitions being cliques in G.
In contrast, if G is a disjoint set of cliques and CE reduces to partition equi-
librium, a potential function for weak (considerate) improving moves in games
with identical resources exists.
3 Existence
This section contains our main theorem showing the existence of CE in RSGs
with strictly increasing delay functions. The existence proof is constructive and
yields a polynomial time algorithm computing a state that is both a CE and a
standard NE for the RSG showing that the two equilibrium concepts intersect.
Theorem 1. For any RSG with strictly increasing delay functions and any as-
sociated social network G, there exists at least one state that is an NE and a CE.
There is a polynomial time algorithm computing such a state.
Proof. We describe a process that starts in a Nash equilibrium and converges
to a CE. This process consists of movements of single players. Every strategy
profile in this sequence is a standard Nash equilibrium.
Consider a state s. Let dmax denote the maximal delay of a player in s.
Note that in a Nash equilibrium, each used resource r has either delay dr(ℓr) =
dmax = dmax or dr(ℓr) < dmax and dr(ℓr + 1) ≥ dmax. In the former case, we
call that resource a high resource, in the latter case, we call it a low resource if
additionally dr(ℓr + 1) = dmax. Let Ni,r(s) denote the set of neighbors of player
i in G that are on resource r in s. We are now ready to describe the process:
1. Compute a Nash equilibrium s.
2. If there is a player i placed on a high resource r and there is a low resource
r′ with |Ni,r(s)| > |Ni,r′(s)| then set s = (s−i, r′), and repeat this step.
3. If there is a player i placed on a high resource r and there is a low resource
r′ with |Ni,r(s)| = |Ni,r′(s)| and dr(ℓr(s) − 1) < dr′(ℓr′(s)) then set s =
(s−i, r
′), and continue with step 2.
4. Output s.
Note that each state produced by this process is a Nash equilibrium. During this
process, the following potential function
φ(s) =
∑
i∈N
M |Ni(s)|+
∑
r∈R
dr(ℓr(s))
decreases strictly from step to step, where we useNi(s) = Ni,si (s) as a shorthand
for the neighbors of i on the same resource and assume M >
∑
r∈R dr(n). One
can easily modify the delay functions such thatM = n|R|2 without changing the
players’ preferences which implies that the process terminates after polynomially
many steps.
To prove that this process results in a CE, we show that if a state s is a NE
and there exists weak considerate improving move s′C then there is also a move
of a single player i ∈ C as described above.
Let H and L denote the set of high and low resources in s, respectively. Let
Rh be the set of resources that are high in s but no longer high in (s
′
C , s−C), and
let Rl be the set of resources that are low in s and become high in (s
′
C , s−C). By
definition, Rh ⊆ H and Rl ⊆ L. Let Nh be the set of players of C on resources
of Rh in s, and let Nl be the set of players of C on resources of Rl in s.
Lemma 1. During the move s′C , all players in Nl are moving from resources in
Rl to resources outside of Rl. In turn, |Nl| + |Rl| players move from resources
in H to the resources in Rl. At least |Nl| + |Rl| players are leaving Rh towards
resources outside of Rh.
Proof. Since s′C is a weak considerate improving move, all players in Nl are mov-
ing from resources in Rl to resources outside of Rl as their delay would increase,
otherwise. These players can only be replaced by players of H as other players
would have an increased delay after the move, otherwise. In turn, altogether
|Nl| + |Rl| players need to move from H to Rl so that the resources of Rl be-
come high resources after the move. Furthermore, we observe that the number of
players on resources in H \Rh does not change during the considered move, and
there are no players entering H \ Rh from outside of H as such players would
have an increased delay, otherwise. As a consequence, there must be at least
|Nl| + |Rl| players that are leaving Rh towards H \ Rh or Rl in order to have
|Nl|+ |Rl| players that move from H to Rl. This proves Lemma 1. ⊓⊔
The lemma implies
|Nh| ≥ |Nl|+ |Rl| . (1)
Let maxh = maxi∈Nh Ni(s) denote the maximum number of neighbors that a
player of Nh has on his resource. The definition maxh implies
|Nh| ≤ (maxh + 1) · |Rh| . (2)
Note that no player of C has a neighbor that has chosen a resource from Rl and
is not in C. Otherwise, this neighbor’s delay would increase during the move
so that s′C would not be a considerate move. Therefore, we can set minl =
mini∈Nh,r∈Rl Ni,r(s), where the choice of i is irrelevant. The definition of minl
immediately implies
|Nl| ≥ minl · |Rl| . (3)
Let us derive some more helpful equations regarding the different kinds of re-
sources. For each resource that decreases its load during the improving move,
there is at least one resource that increases its load by one because the number
of players on each low resource can only increase by one. This gives
|Rh| ≤ |Rl| . (4)
Combining the Equations 2, 1, and 3 gives
(maxh + 1) · |Rh| ≥ |Nh| ≥ |Nl|+ |Rl| ≥ (minl + 1) · |Rl| . (5)
Now, we distinguish between the following two cases.
Case 1: maxh > minl. In this case, we can set i = argmaxj∈Nh Nj(s) and
r′ = argminr∈Rl Ni,r(s), which satisfies the conditions of step 2 of the process.
Case 2: maxh ≤ minl. In this case, Equation 5 yields |Rh| ≥ |Rl|, which, coupled
with Equation 4, implies |Rh| = |Rl|. Substituting this equality back into the
Equation 5 gives maxh ≥ minl which implies maxh = minl. Define q = |Rh| =
|Rl| and k = maxh = minl. Now Equations 2 and 3 yield |Nh| ≤ |Nl|+ q, which
in combination with Equation 1 yields |Nh| = |Nl|+ q.
On average, the resources in Rl hold |Nl|/q players from C in state s and
the resources Rh hold |Nh|/q players from C. We claim that this implies that
each resource in Rl holds exactly |Nl|/q players from C; and each resource in Rh
holds exactly |Nh|/q players from C and no additonal neighbour of one of them.
To see this, let rh denote a resource from Rh holding a maximum number of
players from C and let rl denote a resource from Rl holding a minimum number
of players from C. Let i ∈ Nh be a player assigned to rh. As s′C is a considerate
move, i does not have neighbors outside of C on rl. Thus, if the claim above
would not hold, i would have either at least |Nh|/q neighbors on rh or strictly
less than |Nh|/q − 1 = |Nl|/q neighbors on rl, which would imply maxh > minl
and thus contradict our assumption. As a consequence, |Ni,r(s)| = k = |Ni,r′(s)|,
for every i ∈ Nh, r ∈ Rh, and r′ ∈ Rl.
Now Lemma 1 yields that each of the q resources in Rl is left by its k players
from C and each of the q resources in Rh is left by its k + 1 players from C.
We make a few further observations: The definition of Rh implies that the
number of players on a resource from H \ Rh does not decrease during the
considered move. Besides, this number cannot increase due to a weak improving
move. Next consider a resource r 6∈ H ∪ Rl. The definition of Rl implies that
the number of players on r cannot increase during a weak improving move. Now
suppose the number of players on r would decrease. Then there is a leaving
player i, who moves to either Rh or another resource in L\Rl, as its delay would
increase, otherwise. In the latter case, a different player must make room for i.
By following this player, we can iteratively construct a chain of moving players
until finally there is a player that moves to a resource in Rh. Thus, together
with the players leaving the resources in Rl there are at least qk+1 that need to
migrate to a resource with a delay of less than dmax (after the move). However,
the resources in Rh have only a capacity for taking qk many of such players.
Hence, the number of players on any resource outside of Rl or Rh does not
change during the considered move.
Now consider one of the players from Nl. During the considered move, this
player migrates to another resource having a delay strictly less than dmax (after
the considered move). If this resource does not belong to Rh then another player
needs to leave this resource in order to compensate for the arriving player. Now
we follow that player and, iteratively, construct a chain of moving players leading
from a resource in Rl to a resource in Rh. In this manner, we can decompose
the set of moving players into a collection of qk many chains each of which leads
from Rl to Rh. As we are considering a weak improving move the delays in each
of these chains does not increase and there is at least one such chain leading
from a resource r′ ∈ Rl to a resource r ∈ Rh with dr(ℓr(s)−1) < dr′(ℓr′(s)). We
choose an arbitrary player i ∈ Nh assigned to resource r in s. We have shown
above that, for this player, it holds |Ni,r(s)| = |Ni,r′(s)|. Thus, player i satisfies
the condition in step 3 of our process, which completes our analysis for Case 2.
This shows that, when the process terminates, there is no weak considerate
improving move. Therefore, the resulting state is an CE. ⊓⊔
4 Convergence
Next we show that the dynamics of weak considerate improving moves by gen-
eral cliques does not have the finite improvement property, i.e., the dynamics
corresponding to CE might cycle (Theorem 2). Our construction works even
for resources with identical delays. This separates considerate equilibrium from
partition equilibrium as, in the same setting, the dynamics corresponding to
partition equilibrium admits the finite improvement property (Proposition 1).
Theorem 2. There are symmetric RSGs with strictly increasing and identical
delays and starting states, for which there are infinite sequences of weak consid-
erate improving moves by coalitions that are cliques in G.
Proof. For the proof we construct a game with a modular structure. Our game
consists of a number of smaller games, referred to as blocks. Each block consists
of 14 players and 5 resources, and by itself it is acyclic. However, by creating
social ties across blocks, we create larger cliques that are able to perform “resets”
in one block while making improvements in other blocks. By a careful scheduling
of such reset moves we construct an infinite sequence of moves.
More formally, we have 19 blocks, and in each block i, we have 14 players.
There are 8 players Bi, Ci, Di, Ei, F i, Gi, P i, Qi involved in our sequence, while
6 additional “dummy” players never move. The dummy players are singleton
nodes in the social network and are only required to, in essence, simulate non-
identical resources by increasing some of the delays to larger values. The social
graph consists of internal links within each block and inter-block connections
as follows. For each block, there are edges {Bi, F i}, {Ci, Ei} and {Di, Gi}. In
addition, for each i = 1, ..., 19 there are two inter-block cliques,
– {Di, P i, P i+1, Bi+1, Di+2, P i+2, Ci+6, Ei+6} and
– {Di, Qi, Qi+1, Ci+1, Di+2, Qi+2, Bi+9, F i+9},
where the exponent is meant to cycle through the numbers 1 to 19, i.e., above
P j means P ((j−1) mod 19)+1.
The 95 resources are denoted by rij with i = 1, . . . , 19, j = 1, . . . , 5. The
delay functions are identical dr(x) = x for all r ∈ R. Note that in general, our
example does not require linear delays, it suffices to ensure dr(3) > dr(2).
Let us consider a single block i and a sequence of six states within this block
depicted in Fig. 1. Note that α → β represents a weak considerate improving
ri1 r
i
2 r
i
3 r
i
4 r
i
5
Ci Bi P i Qi
α Ei Di F i x x
x Gi x x x
Ci Di P i Qi
β Ei Bi F i x x
x Gi x x x
Ci Di P i Qi
γ Ei Bi F i x x
x Gi x x x
Ci Bi P i Qi
δ Ei Di F i x x
x Gi x x x
Di Bi P i Qi
ǫ Ei Ci F i x x
x Gi x x x
Di Bi P i Qi
ζ Ei Ci F i x x
x Gi x x x
Ci Bi P i Qi
α Ei Di F i x x
x Gi x x x
Fig. 1. Sequence of six states within a block i that are attained during an infinite
sequence of weak considerate improving moves.
move for {Di, Gi}, where Di performs the move, and Gi strictly improves. Sim-
ilarly, β → γ is a weak considerate improving move for {Ci, Ei}, δ → ǫ for
{Di, Gi}, and ǫ → ζ for {Bi, F i}. The steps γ → δ and ζ → α are resets, in
which a cyclic switch is performed and no player within the block strictly im-
proves. It suffices to show that these steps can be implemented with moves by
inter-block cliques.
Consider the first reset γ → δ, in which Di and Bi swap places, and for sim-
plicity assume w.l.o.g. that i = 5. This swap is executed in three moves, where we
first swap in P 5 for D5, then swap P 5 and B5 and finally swap out P 5 to bring
D5 back in. This cyclic switch is the result of the following sequence of weak con-
siderate improving moves: (1) coalition {D3, P 3, P 4, B4, D5, P 5, C9, E9} applies
a deviation where D5 and P 5 exchange their places, and C9 moves away from E9
in block 9 as β → γ prescribes; (2) coalition {D4, P 4, P 5, B5, D6, P 6, C10, E10}
improves by swapping P 5 and B5, and moving C10 away from E10 in block 10;
(3) finally, D5 and P 5 swap with coalition {D5, P 5, P 6, B6, D7, P 7, C11, E11}
where C11 moves away from E11 in block 11. In the final dynamics, we will use
these moves also to simultaneously perform swaps in the other blocks 3, 4, 6,
and 7.
The second reset swap ζ → α by D5 and C5 can be done in similar fashion
by a circular swap involving Q5 and using the Bi and F i players of blocks
i = 12, 13, 14. Note that our edges are carefully designed not to generate any
undesired connections. In particular, D5, P 5, B5 rely on the movement of C9,
C10 and C11 to execute their swaps. During these swaps, B9, B10 and B11 are
deteriorated. None of the deteriorated players are attached to players in the
respective improving coalitions, i.e., none of D3, P 3, P 4, B4, D5 or P 5 are
friends with B9, none of D4, P 4, P 5, B5, D6 or P 6 are friends with B10, and
none of D5, P 5, P 6, B6, D7 or P 7 are friends with B11. In addition, for making
the switch between D5, Q5 and C5 we use the movement of B12, B13 and B14.
Note that none of the players required to execute the switches are friends with
C12, C13 or C14, respectively.
An infinite sequence of weak considerate improving moves can now, for ex-
ample, be obtained from a starting state as follows. We indicate for each block
in which state α to ζ it is initialized. Here γ1, γ2, ζ1, and ζ2 indicate the inter-
mediate states of the corresponding circular resetting swaps.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
ζ2 ζ1 ζ ζ ζ ζ ζ ζ ζ ǫ δ γ2 γ1 γ γ γ γ β α
In the first step, we can simultaneously advance blocks 1-3 from (ζ2, ζ1, ζ) to
(α, ζ2, ζ1) using movement of B
10, which advances block 10 to ζ. In the next
step we advance blocks 12-14 from (γ2, γ1, γ) to (δ, γ2, γ1) using movement of
C18, which advances block 18 to γ. Next, we make two internal switches in
blocks 11 from δ to ǫ and 19 from α to β. In this way, we have shifted the state
sequence by one block, which implies that we can repeat this sequence endlessly.
⊓⊔
In contrast, observe that if the graph is a set of disjoint cliques, then for games
with identical and strictly increasing delay function we can easily construct a
potential function showing existence and acyclicity with respect to weak (con-
siderate) improving moves.
Proposition 1. In every symmetric RSG with strictly increasing, identical de-
lays every sequence of weak improving moves of allowed partitions is finite and
ends in a partition equilibrium.
Note that in this case we can assume w.l.o.g. that dr(x) = x for all r ∈ R.
Also, each weak improving move decreases the sum of costs of all players in
the partition. Thus, the results of [7] for linear delays directly imply the finite
improvement property.
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